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of outer space, the moon, and other celestial bodies.' Approval of the
Treaty was recommended unanimously by the Political Committee of the
General Assembly on 17 December 1966.' Two days later, the Treaty was
endorsed by a unanimous vote of the General Assembly.' Regardless of
the total number of States which may sign and ratify the Treaty,' a remarkable endeavor of great significance to international law and politics
has reached fruition. Nations often in conflict with one another and adhering t o widely divergent political philosophies have agreed on the first
Treaty of general applicability governing activity in outer space.'
The principles set forth in the Treaty had been advanced previously in
the form of General Assembly resolutions, analogous international agreements, domestic legislation, statements by government otficials, articles by
scholars in the field and other expressions of views. However, agreement
on the Treaty was primarily the product of the labors of the twenty-eight
member Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations General Assembly's
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space during the Subcommittee's Fifth Session held in Geneva from 12 July to 4 August 1966, and
in New York from 12 to 16 September 1966. The few issues requiring
resolution subsequent to the conclusion of the Fifth Session were the subject of various bilateral negotiations and other discussions held during the
Twenty-First Session of the General Assembly. Agreement was obtained
on those issues shortly before the 8 December announcement that agreement on the Treaty as a whole had been reached.
This paper will first consider briefly the expressions of views, international agreements and other events prior to the Fifth Session, which are
pertinent to the establishment of principles governing exploration and
use of outer space and celestial bodies. The critical events immediately
prior to the Fifth Session will be summarized. Considerable attention will
then be devoted to the two draft treaties introduced at the outset of the
Fifth Session, and the discussions and amendments of those drafts which
culminated in the agreed upon text which was announced, in final form,
on 8 December 1966.
use

A. Principles Applicable To Celestial Bodies
Although the scope of the Treaty as eventually agreed upon includes
both outer space and celestial bodies, an important a s k t of the deliberations leading to agreement on the Treaty is the extent t o which the nations

'

Agreement on the m a y was amounced in the United States through a statement by President
DOCUMENTS
1781
Lyndon B. Johnson. U.S./U.N. Press Release 5011, reprinted in 2 PRESIDENTULZ.
(1966); 11 DEP'TSTATE BULL. 912 (1966); N.Y.Times, 9 Dec. 1966, at 1 , col. 8.
'Washington Post, 18 Dec. 1966, at A-1, col. 7.
a Washington Post, 20 Dec. 1966, at A-9, col. 1.
'As of this writing, 79 States have signed the Treaty and 5 States have deposited instruments
of rati6cation.
The Treaty is o6cially entitled "Treaty on Principles Governing the. Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Ocher Celestial Bodies," and is annexed to a resolution of the General Assembly. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L.396 (1966). The text of the
treaty is reproduced in 3 3 J. AIR L. 8r COM. 132 (1967).

'
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and individuals involved were concerned, for the first time, with the
formulation of realistic principles which might govern activity on celestial
bodies in addition to, but as distinct from, outer space? This consideration.
of celestial bodies was based upon a body of thought and action that preceded the Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee. Even prior to 1960, a
considerable amount of commentary existed on the question of '"whether
it is possible for a terrestrial nation-state to acquire sovereignty over all
or part of a natural celestial body, and what would be required under
existing law to make such a claim legally valid."' Analogies were drawn
to the manner in which nations had previously sought to exert legal claims
to sovereignty over portions of the earth's surface, e.g., through discovery,
occupation, annexation and contiguity.' Considerable discussion arose over
the legal effect of the reported striking of the moon by an early Soviet
satellite carrying the Soviet flag.' However, the Soviet Union did not seek
to exert any claim of sovereignty based upon this occurrence.
Although writers regarded the legal principles derived from exploration
of the earth's surface as potentially applicable to exploration of celestial
bodies, they did not consider such applicability to be desirable. The suggestion was made that "both public and private groups
work towards
formulating standards and procedures that will guarantee access by all
to these resources on equitable terms and prevent interference by one
State with the scientific programs of another."" As early as 1959, the
American Bar Association passed a resolution declaring "that in the comcelestial bodies should not be subject to
mon interest of mankind
exclusive appropriation."11 A similar concern was evidenced at the o6cial
level. The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, created by the General Assembly in 1959, t w k the position
in its report that "serious problems could arise if States claimed, on one
ground or another, exclusive rights over all or part of a celestial body,"
and suggested that "some form of international administration over celestial bodies might be adopted."- In an address before the General Assembly in September 1960, President Eisenhower ~roposedthat :

. ..

...

'A portion o f the materid in Sections I1 and In o f this paper llso appears in Dembling and
Arons, Tbe Unifed Nations Celestial Bodies Convention, 32 J. A n - L . & COM. 135 (1966).
'Lipson and Kauenbach, Report to the Nafwnrtl Aeronautics and Space Administration on tbe

Lmv of Outer Space, A.B.A. FOUND.22(a) (1960).
8Zd. See also McDougal and Lipson, Perspcctivrs for a Lnu o f Outer Spore, 12 AM. J. Im'L L.
407 (1958); Finch, T m e s t r i d C l a i m t o Celestial Bodies, paper prsenred t o the SECONDC o ~ m ~vrurrON T m LAW OF OUTER SPACE, X m ANNUAL CONG.INT'L ASI~~ONAUTICAL
FED., London,
4 Sept. 1919.
W,
Thesis No. 86, Industrial College o f the Armed Forces (May
'Mcnter, As&-tical
1959), reproduced in S-snnf
ON THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF SPACE EXPLORATION,
SEN. DOC
No. 26, 87th Cong.. 1st Seu. 372 (1961).
"Lipum and Katzm.bach, wpra note 7 , at 24. See a h Widcox, International Coopnation in the
Use of Outer Space, 40 DEP'T S T A BULL.
~
339 (19S9), McDougd et. d., T b e Enjoyment and
Acquisition of Resources in Outer Space, 111 U. PA. L. REV.521 (1963).
"Lipson and Katzmbach, id.
"Report o f the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A 4141/21
(1959). For discussions o f the Ad Hoc Committee, sa J m u p and Taubenfcld, Tbe Ad Hoc Committee on tbe Peacefd Uses o f Outer Space, in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 877 (19 19) ; Un&d Nut&
Esfablisbn Committee on Peaceful Uses o f Outer Space, 40 ~ P ' TSTATEBULL.24 (1919); Aaronson, Ad Hoc Committee 071 tbe Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 227 LAW TIMES 17 (1959).
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1. We agree that celestial bodies are not subject w national appropriation
by any claims of sovereignty.
2. We agree that the nations of the world shall not engage in warlike
activities on these bodies.
3. We agree, subject to verification, that no nation will put into orbit
or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction. All lauchings of
spacecraft shall be verified by the United Nations?

However, as the Ad Hoc Committee had previously concluded:

Whik scientific programmes envisaged relatively early exploration of
cekstial bodies, human settlement and extensive exploitation of resources were
not likely in the near future. For this reason, the Committee believed that
problems relating to the settlement and exploitation of celestial bodies did not
require priority treatment.''

Thus, since the formation of the present Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space in 1960, attention has been directed primarily to problems
associated with the launching of spacecraft, their revolving in earth orbit,
and their return to earth. The proceedings of the Fifth Session of the
Legal Subcommittee, however, reveal a- greatly incread concern with
the need to provide legal principles governing the exploration and we of
the moon and other celestial bodies, in addition to outer space.
Agreement on the principle of freedom of exploration of celestial bodies
is not devoid of analogous legal
As the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Peaceful Use. of Outer Space noted in its report (in 1959), during
the International Geophysical Year, 1917-5 8, and subsequently,
countries tbroughout the world proceeded on the premise of the permissibility
of the launching and flight of the space vehicles which were launched, regardless of the territory they 'passed over' during the course of their flight
. believes that, with this practice,
through outer space The committee
there may have been initiated the recognition or establishment of a generally
accepted ruk to the d e c t that, in principle, outer space is, on conditions of
equality, freely available for exploration and use by all in accordance with
existing or future international law and agreements.''

..

If one includes principles applicable to the exploration of celestial bodies
under those pertaining to the exploration of outer space generally, the
practice developed during the International Geophysical Year and further
developed by subsequent space flights would support the view that, as a
principle of customary international law, anything outside the earth's
atmosphere, except an item launched from earth, is not subject t o claim
of national sovereignty.

B. Analogies To Other Treaties
An obvious precedent for an international convention governing activities in outer space and on celestial bodies is the Treaty concerning AntarclaAddresn by President Dwighc D. Eisenhower t o the U.N. Geperal Asranbly, 10 Sept. 1960,
43 DEP'T STATE

BULL.

514 ( 1 9 6 0 ) .

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 12, at 21.
" I d . a t 23.
l4
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tica." Indeed, the draft conventions tabled by the United States and the
Soviet Union at the Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee, contaia
provisions quite obviously based upon analogous provisions in that Treaty.
Article I provides that Antarctica shall be used only for peaceful purposes." Article I1 provides for freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation in that regard." Article I11 provides for exchange
of scientific information and personnel." Article IV, paragraph 2, prohibits nations from making additional claims of sovereignty, although it
does not require renunciation of existing claims.*
Another treaty which affords some precedent to agreement on the use
of outer space and celestial bodies for peaceful purposes is the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty." Article I provides, in part, as follows:
1. Each d the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent,
and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear
explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any orher environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris
to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted

. . . ."

'"The Antarctic Treaty signed at Washington on 1 %. 1919, by the se- Antaritic sector
S u r a (Argentina, Australia, Chile, R a n q New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom) and
Belgium, J a p q Union of South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The history of
the multiple claims to various portions of Antarctica, as well as the assertions of nacional inrmsrs
is fully considered in P. JESSUP 8 H. TAUKN-,
CONT~~OLS
~
~
OUZEn
l
l SPACEAND r n AwrARCTIC h - ~(1959). See also Lissitzyrt, Tbe Ammirun Position on Onfcr Space and Antarctica,
13 h.
J. I N ~ LL. 126 (1959).
Article I provides:
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter a h , any
measures of a military mature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortihtions, the
carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The p-t
Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or any other peaceful purpose.
laArticle 11 provides:
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and coopaation toward that end, a6 applied
during the International Geophysiul Year, shall c o n t i n y subject to the provisions of thc present
Treaty.
"Article 111 provides:
1. In o r d e to promote international cooperation in scientific i n v d g a t b o in A n t h a , as
provided for in Arcicle I1 of rhe prerent Treaty, the c o n w t i n g pnnies agree that, to the gratest
exrent feasible and practicable:
(a) information regvding plans for &tSc
progruns in Antarctica shall be exchanged
to permit maximum economy and e6ciency of operations.
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions m d stations.
(c) scientific observations and d r r from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely
availaue.
2. In implementing thii Article, every encouragement shzll be given w the ~ a b l i h m c n tof
cooperative w o r k relations with those Specialid Agencies of the U n i d Nations and other
international organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica.
"O Amcle N.Paragraph 2, provides:
No acts or activities taking place whiie the preseot Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis
for asrereing, supporting, or denying a cIaim ro territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or c r a t e any
r i g h ~of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to M i t d
sovereignty shall be -ed
while the present Treaty is in force.
" T r a t y Banning Nuclear Wupon T a t s in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water,
signed in Moscow, 5 Aug. 1963, reproduced in 49 DEP'TSTAIE BULL. 239 (1963).
"Article I.P m n p h 2, provides:
Each of the parties to thii Treary undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouragiog,
or in mp. way pyCicipzting in, the carrying out of any nuclar weapon test explosion, or any other
nuclear explosion, m y w h m which would noc take place in any of the environments described, or
&t referred w, in paragraph 1 of rhi Aniclc
hns
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Whether one regards the moon and other celestial bodies as included in
"outer space," as referred to in subparagraph (a), or "in any other environment," as referred to in subparagraph (b), nuclear explosions are
effectively prohibited from being carried out on celestial bodies. Thus, the
negotiation and drafting of principles providing for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.and celestial bodies proceeded from the
standpoint that an activity of immense military significance had already
been banned.

C. Prior Activity In The United Nations
Although the Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee provided the
opportunity for intensive examination, in the United Nations, of
principles governing the exploration and use of outer space and celestial
bodies, it was not the first time that the U.N. had ever considered this
matter." A t the first meeting of the present Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space in November-December 1961, the nations represented agreed on a draft resolution, originally proposed by the United
States, which, as adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1961,
inter aliu, commended to States for their guidance in the,exploration and
use of outer space the following principles:
.&st

(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies
to outer space and celestial bodies;
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by
all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national

appropriation."

Proposed elaborations of, and additions to, the principles stated in Resolution 1721 were further discussed during the First and Second Sessions of
the Legal Subcommittee in 1962 and 1963.~This discussion of "basic
principles," together with discussions of draft conventions and resolutions
covering assistance to, and return of, astronauts and space vehicles, and
of liability for damages caused by space vehicles, led to the unanimous
adoption by the General Assembly, on 13 December 1963, of Resolution
1962 (XVIII) entitled Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States tn the Exploration and Use of Outer S ~ A CRepeating
~ . ~
=See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra, qxs I2 and 14.
" G . A. Res. 1721 (XVI).On the United Stata position, Ambassador Adld E. Stevenson made
the following statement in General Aasembly Committee I (Political and Security) on 4 Dec.
1961:
Freedom of space and celestial bodies, like freedom of the seas, will serve the interest of dl
nations.
Outer space and cele~tialbodies are free for exploration and use by all states in conformity with
international law and ue not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty or ocherwise.
46 DEP'T STATEB m . 180, 181 (1962).

See a h address by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of Sure for International Orguriution
Affairs, 22 Oct. 1961, St. Louis University, reproduced in 45 DEP'T STATEBULL. 796, 800 (1961).
See Dernbling and A m , Space h and tbe Unifed Nations: Tbe Work of tbe LPgd Submumiftee of tbe U#ifed Nations Committee on tbe Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 32 J . Aa L. &
COM. 329, 331 (1966).
U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L.331 and CORR. 1 (1963). For rhe fdJ text, see 49 DEP'TSTATEBULL.

"
"

1012 (1963).

19671

OUTER SPACE TREATY

42 5

what had already been covered in Resolution 1721, the Declaration, in
paragraphs 2 and 3, phides:
Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by aII
States on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.
Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation
by daim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any ather
means.

Although the Declaration, like other General Assembly resolutions, does
not having the contractually binding characteristics of a treaty, the Declaration does reflect a certain intemational understanding of the principles
which ought to govern the exploration and use of outer space and celestial
bodies and, therefore, provides evidence of the customary international law
in that regard. Thus, over two and one-half years prior to the Fifth Session,
a general consensus had been obtained among the nations involved in space
exploration that outer space and celestial bodies should be governed by
the principles of international law and free for peaceful exploration and
use without being subject to claims of national sovereignty.
During its previous four sessions, particularly the Third and Fourth
Sessions in 1964 and 1965, the Legal Subcommittee had been primarily
concerned with the relatively narrow subjects of assistance to and return
of astronauts and space objects and liability for damages caused by space
vehicles. By the close of the Fourth Session in October 1965, agreement
had been virtually achieved on a draft convention covering the former
subject, and considerable progress had been made on the latter." However,
the activities of the Legal Subcommittee were not limited to these two
subjects. Under the mandate governing its activities during the Fifth
Session, the Subcommittee was not only "urged" by the General Assembly
to prepare draft international agreements on "assistance and return7' and
"liability" but also "to give consideration to incorporating in international agreement fonn, in the future as appropriate, legal principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer pace."^
The consideration by the Legal Subcommittee of the draft conventions on
exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies came within this
last part of its mandate.
That a sense of urgency had developed concerning the need for an
international agreement on the exploration of the moon and other celestial
bodies was made clear in a statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson on
7 May 1966. He emphasized the need to "take action now
to insure
that explorations of the moon and other celestial bodies will be for peaceful
purposes only" and "to be sure that our astronauts and those of other
nations can freely conduct scientific investigations of the moon.'" The
President suggested a treaty containing rbe f0110wing elements:

...

Dabling and Arws, supra note 21 at 349, 371.
" G . A. Rcs. 2130 OM), 21 h.
1965, Art. I.
"For full text, see 14 DEP'TSTATEBULL. 900 (1966).

*See
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I. The moon and other celestial bodies should be free for exploration and
use by a l l countria. No country should be permitted to advance a c k i m
of sovereignty.
2. There should be freedom of scientific investigation, and all countries
should cooperate in scientific activities relating to c e h d bodies.
3. Studies should be made to avoid harmful contamination.
4. Astronauts of one country should give any necessary help to astronauts
of mother country.
S. NOcountry should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction
on a celestial body. Weapons tests and military maneuvers should be forbidden.

Two days after the president made his statemeqt, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg addressed a letter to
Dr. Kurt Walof Austria, the Chairman of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, requesting an early convening of the Legal
Subcommittee to consider the treaty proposed by President Johnson."
On 30 May 1966, Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a letter from Mr. A. A. Grhyko,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., requesting the inclusion of
an item on the agenda for the 21st Session of the General Assembly entitled "Conclusion of an International Agreement on Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Conquest of
the Moon and Other Cekstial Bodies."= In his letter, Mr. Gromyko suggested that such an international agreement be based on four principles,
which appeared to be quite similar to the principles stated by President
Johnson.&
On 16 June Ambassador Goldberg addressed a letter to the Chairman
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space tabling the United
States' pro@
draft "Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon
'and Other Celestial Bodies."= On the same day, Mr. Platon Morozov,
Acting Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R., transmitted to the
Secretary-General, for inclusion in the agenda of the Twenty-First Session,
"Id. at 900-01.
"U.N. Doc. A/6341 (1966).
"Mr. Gromyko stated his proposal as follows:
1. The moon and other celestial bodies should be open for exploration and use by all States,
without discrimbation of any kind. All States enjoy freedom of scientific research in regard to the
moon and other celestial bodies on equal terms and in accordance with the fundamental princides
of international law.
2. The moon and 0th- c e l d bodies should be used by all States exclusively for peaceful purposes. No military bases or installations of any kind, including facilities for nuclear and other weapons of nusr desuuction of any type, should be established on the moon or other celestial bodies.
3. The exploration and use of the moon and other celestial balies shall be carried on for the
good and in the interest of aU mankind; the moon and other celestial bodies shall not be subject
to appropriation or terntorid claims of any kind.
4. I n the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies, States shall be guided by the
principles of cooperation and mutual aid and shall carry out their activities with due regard for the
relevant interests of other States and with a view to the maintenance of internationaI F.ce and
security.

"U.N. Doc. A/AC105/32 (1966). The text of the United States draft is reproduced in Repmt
of tbe Legal Subnmrnsitfre on #be Work of Its Fiffb Session (12 July - 4 Ang. and 12-16 Sepf.,
1966) fo fbe C m m i f f c e on fbe Peaceful Uses of Outer Sbace, U.N. Doc. No. A/ACIOS/~S,
Annex I at 6-9 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as "Report of Legal Subcommittee"], dm in $ I DEP'T
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the Soviet proposed draft "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies"" Up to this point, the Soviet Union had desired that
consideration of these proposals await the tiart of the Twenty-First Session
of the General Assembly. However, in diplomatic discussions on 17 June,
the Soviets reversed their position and even suggested that the Legal Subcommittee convene prior to 12 July:
the date proposed by the United
States. During the following week, agreement was reached that 12 July
would be the date on which formal consideration would commence and
that the meeting would be held at Geneva, the date being the preference
of the United States, and the place being the preference of the %iet
union."

A. General Scope And Purpose Of The Treaty
During the first few days of the Geneva portion of the Fifth Session,
the various delegations discussed the urgent need for the Treaty, whether its
scope should be limited to activities on celestial bodies or should include
outer space as well, and whether its provisions should state general principles or should provide specific rules for the conduct of activity in outer
space-and on celestial bodies." There was a belief that a treaty regulating
tlie conduct of States on celestial bodies should be agreed upon as soon
as possible. It was apparent that the delegations regarded the prospect of
manned lunar landings by both the United States and the Soviet Union
as necessitating regulation before such landings. As one delegate stated,
"prompt action was essential, not only because the legal aspects of the
problem might hamper scientific and technical progress, but also because such progress would .depend on the correct solution of the legal
problem.'J' While celestial bodies are as yet practically untouched by man:
the use of celestial bodies, if not
there was a particular desire to
outer space as well, for military purposes. As "the arms race and the conevery
flicts which took place on earth were bound to affect space
effort should therefore be made to limit the arms race wherever possible.'*
In this regard, there was also general agreement that a critical need existed
to include a provision banning nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction from outer space.u

...

"U.N. Doc. A/6312 (1966). The t a t o f the Soviet draft is reproduced in ANNEX I o f the
Report of tbe Legd Sybcmmittee at 12-16.
as W n s h i o n Post, 18 June 1966, at A-1, col. 7.
ssN.Y. Times, 23 June 1966.
"All twenty-eight members of the Legal Subcommittee were present. They arc: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, B d , Bulgaria, G d n , Chad, Czechoslovpgia, Prance, Hungary, India, Iran, ItaIy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexim, Mongolk Morocco, Poland, Rumania, S i Leone,
Sweden, United Arab Republic, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States.
Statement o f the Mongolian delegate in U.N. Doc. A/A?IO~/C.S/SR. 62 at 9. The discussions which took place at the fo~malmeetings were summuued and published in the form of
Summary.Reporu [hereinafter cited ns S m . %P.].
-The moon has been struck by lnan made objecrs.
QStatmmt of the Polish delegate in Sma. REP. 62 at 7.
%a sn-t
of d i e Czech delegate in Su& REP. I8 at 7.

"

428

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 3 3

The belief that agreement must be reached as soon as possible affected

the matter of whether the agrement should be limited to a statement of
general principles or whether it should establish more specific regulation
of space activity. As noted above, previous sessions of the Legal Subcommittee had devoted considerable attention to the detailed draft treaties
on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles and liability
for damages caused by space vehicles. Various delegations expressed a desire that the Subcommittee continue its work on these drafts during the
Fifth Session, and were not satisfied with the inclusion of general provisions on those subjects as items in a treaty as broad as those suggested by
the United States and the Soviet draftsq However, the Subcommittee was
interested in obtaining "maximum results in a minimum time" and believed it "should limit itself strictly to settling essential and urgent issues.'*
Most of the delegations felt that the principles set forth in the United
States and Soviet drafts were "a starting point and would be applied in
practice later-in particular in the field of liability and the return of
astronauts. It was therefore essential to define and codify now the largest
As stated by Mr. Platon Morozov,
number of points of agreement .
the head of the Soviet delegation to the Fifth Session, and later agreed to
by the members of the Subcommittee, the inclusion in the Treaty of two
broadly phrased articles on assistance and return and liability respectively
"was not intended to prejudice the efforts already being made in the Subcommittee to conclude a special agreement on those matters.'*
A further matter to which considerable discussion was devoted during
the general debate was whether the Treaty should establish rules gwerning
activity on celestial bodies or should include all of outer space as well.
The most obvious digerence between the Soviet and United States drafts
was that the %viet draft would have applied to celestial bodies and outer
space while the United States draft would have applied only to celestial
bodies. As expected, the delegate from the Soviet Union and the representatives from Communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe advocated
the Soviet versione In addition, however, several delegations from nonaligned and pro-Western nations supported the Soviet position on this
matter. Cogent arguments were advanced to the effect that the implementation of several of the proposed treaty articles would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, should the scope of the Treaty be limited to
activities on celestial bodies to the exclusion of outer space."
In v i m of the various statements made concerning: the scow of the

. ..""

&See scaremenu by the Swedish delegate in SUM. REP. 19 at 4, the Indian delegate in SUM.
REP. 17 at 18, the Austrian delegate in SUM. REP. 58 at 3, the Italian delegate in SUM. REP. 18
at 4, and the Lebanese delegate in SUM. REP. 18 at 7.
"Statement by the Belgian delegate in S m . REP. 61 at 7.
U~tatemencby the Canadian delegate in SUM. REP. 68 at 10.
&SUM. REP. 17 at 13.
*See statements by the Soviet ddegate, SUM. REP. 62 at 11; the Rumanian delegate, SUM.
REP. 61 at 1; the Bulgarian delegate, SUM. REP. 61 at 2; and the Hungarian delegice,
. SUM. ReP.
19 at 3.
"See statements by the Indian delegate, SUM. REP. 63 at 3; the Austrian delegate, SUM. REP.
18 at 3; the Japanese delegate, SUM. REP. 18 at 6; the French delegate. SUM. REP. 17 at 16; and
the Mexican delegate, SUM. REP. 62 at 8 .
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treaty, the United States delegation recognized that a consensus had been
reached on the broad proposition that "the Treaty should not be limited
to celestial bodies alone but should include outer space along the lines of
the U.S.S.R. draft" and agreed to work towards the conclusion of such a
treaty.' In return, the Soviet delegate stated that his delegation was prepared "to consider the possibility of - including, in the draft treaty to be
prepared by the Subcommittee, provision which did not appear in the
Soviet text, including certain points from the United States' draft.'m
T h e Soviet delegate was referring particularly to the provisions in the
United States draft that provided for reporting of scientific information
and free access to all areas of celestial bodies. As a comparison of the
Soviet and United States drafts readily indicates, there were not many substantive points of difference between the Soviet and United States positions on the matters sought to be covered.
Thus,even before the Subcommittee began its article by article analysis
of the respective drafts, a reasonable amount of agreement &ed between.
the two major space powers, and among all the members of the Subcommittee, on the general scope and purpose of the Treaty. The remainder of
the discussions during the Fifth Session concerned specific matters to be
covered in the Treaty.

B. Outer Space, Inckding The Moon And Other Celestial Bodies Shall Be
Free For Exploration And Use Fm The Benefit Of All, Shall Not Be
Subject To Clainas Of Sovereignty, And Shall Be G o v e m d
In Accordance W i t h Internaticmcrl Lmu.
The Preamble and Articles I, 11 and I11 of the Treaty state broad principles which, from the outset of discussion, were generally acceptable to
the members of the Subcommittee and provoked little disagreement as
to wording. The texts of these provisions were taken almost entirely from
the Preamble and Articles I, I1 and I11 of the Soviet draft. The same general principles appeared in Articles 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the United States
draft, but were stated d8erently. The &st three articles of the Treaty,
as eventually approved, are, in large part, a d i c a t i o n of paragraphs 1
through 4 of the Declaration of Legal Principks, and are analogous tcn
certain principles set forth in the Antarctic Treaty. Thus agreement a.
the text of these provisions without much debate was not surprising.
Despite general agreement on the principles stated in these provisions,
a few differences of opinion were voiced during the Geneva portion of
the Session prior to agreement on a final text. Article I, Paragraph 2, of
the Treaty provides that the benefits of the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall accrue to all
countries "irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development." The implied reference to the developing countries appeared initially
in the Preamble to the Soviet draft. However, the delegations from those
*SUM,
W.
63 at 2. The head of the United Scares dclcgarion war Ambassador Arthur J.
Goldberg, penrunene npresentative of the United States t o the Uni+ Nations.
a Sw. REP. 62 a t . 11.
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countries t w k the position that such language should be included as a
part of the binding treaty ~cnnmitmrnt,~~
and it was ultimately agreed
that such language should be included in the Treaty.
A related concept appears in the second
of Article I which
provides, in part, for exploration and
of outer space and celestial bodies
"without discrimination of any kind" and "on a basis of equality." The
United States delegate suggested that the phrase "without discrimination of
any kind" appeared redundant. He argued that the expression "on the basis
of equality," derived from Paragraph 2 of the Declaration of Legal Principles, adequately covered the subject, and the addition of "without disHowever,
crimination of any kind" in the Soviet draft was not ne~essary.~'
supporters of the-soviet draft insisted that this explicit nonciiscriminatioi
language corresponds to a most favored nation clause which is necessary to
assure cooperation among nations in space exploration. While the words
<c
on a basis of equality" may convey the same thought, it was argued
that the main consideration was not de facto equality, but rather the
absence of discrimination between States? In view of the arguments made
in favor of specific inclusion of this nondiscrimination language, the
United States delegate withdrew his objection, and later fully endorsed
the agreed upon l&guage of Article I GI stating that this provision, together with others, "make[s] clear the intent of the Treaty that outer
space and celestial bodies are open not just to the big powers or the &st
arrivals but shall be available to all, both now and in the future. This
principle is a strong safeguard for the interests of those states which have,
at the present time, little or no active space program of their own.'^'S
Article VI of the United States draft and Article I of the Soviet draft
provided for free access to all areas (in the case of the former) or all
regions (in the case of the latter) of celestial bodies. The last phrase of
the second paragraph of Article I of the Treaty provides that "there shall
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies." It might appear, from a
comparison of this phrase with the comparable provision in the United
States draft, that .the United States version had proved acceptable to the
Subcommittee. However, this provision must be read in the light of

"

S& statements by the Czech delegate, SUM. REP. 64 at 4; the United Arab Republic delegate,
SUM.REP. 61 at 7; the Indian delegate, SUM. REP. 65 at 8; the Brazilian delegate, SUM.REP. 63
at 9; and the Hungarian delegate, SUM. REP. 71 at 22.
Svan. REP.63 at I.
S'Statemenu of the Hungarian delegate, SUM. REP. 64 a t 3; and the Rumanian delegate,
Svar. REP. 63 at 7.
=Statnnent by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg More General Assembly Committee I (Political
and Security), 17 Dee. 1966, reprinted in 16 DEP'T STATEBULL. 7 8 , 81 (1967). During the hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to Senate approval of the Treaty, Senaton J. William Fdbright and Albert Gore questioned Ambassador Goldberg on the possibiity that
to m+ke its communications satellites, including those for
Article I would require the United Stdefense communications, available for the bendt of all countries. Ambassador Goldbug replied, in
&st, that Arricle I is a statement of geneml goals, and that separate international agreementa
would be required to cover the use of particular satellites. HePrings on Exemfive D, Before bbc
Seaufe C m m . on Foreign RelafrOns, 90th C~LI& 1st Sa., "Treaty on Outer Space," at 31-37,
7 & 13 March and 12 A P d (1967). [hereinafter referred to ;~sSenute Hemings]. B a d on this cxplanation, the Committee stated in its Report that "It is the widerstanding of the Committee on
Foreign Relatiom that nothing in Article I, paragraph 1, of the Treaty diminisho or alters the
how it shares rbe benefits and results of its space activities."
right of the United States to d&e
T r e a t y cm Outer Space," S. Exec. Doc. No. 8, 90th Cong., la h
s.4 (1967).
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Article XII, which provides that "All stations, installations, equipment
and space vehicles shall be open to representatives of other States Parties
to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity." The "free access" provision of
Article I should therefore be read to mean that there shall be free access
at all times to all areas of outer space and celestial bodies, except as provided in Article XII. The deliberations.leading to Article XII, including
possible meanings of "reciprocity," will be discussed 2nfra.
Article I, Paragraph 1, of the Treaty, as well as other provisions, applies
to the "use" of outer space and celestial bodies as well as to the "explaration" thereof. Although there was m e difference of opinion over the
meaning of the word "use," as distinguished -from "exploration," it appeared that most of the delegations agreed with the French delegate that
"use" means exploitation. The French delegate cited existing "uses" of
outer space for meteorological research and telecommunications, and potential use of the moon, e.g., for the extraction. of minerals."' Since the
analogous provisions of the Declaration of Legal Principles apply to "use"
as well as to "exploration," there was no disagreement that the scope of
the Treaty should include "use" of outer space and celestial bodies, even
though potential uses of outer space and celestial bodies can be foreseen
only to a limited extent a t present.
The text of Article 11, which prohibits national appropriation of outer
space and celestial bodies, provoked only a few minutes of debate. The
wording of the second sentence of Article 1 of the United States draft
and the wording of Article 11 of the Soviet draft are almost identical.
Agreement was reached on the final text when the Soviet delegate concurred in a suggestion by the United States delegate that the words "and
celestial bodies" in the Soviet draft be replaced by the words "including
the moon and other ce1estial bodies" and another minor drafting ~ha.n~e.5~
Although there was some later criticism of the use of the word "appropriation" for
vaguenessP the Soviet delegate had indicated, at a
prior stage of the discussions, that the term referred to the ban on assertion
of national claims by way of any human activity in outq space or on the
moon or other celestial bodies." As explained by Ambassador Goldberg to
the Political Committee of the General Assembly, Article 11, by banning
national appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies, reinforces the
free access language in Article I." If an individual nation cannot claim
sovereignty to any particular area of outer space or of a celestial body, it
cannot deny access to that area. However, as stated above, there may be a
limitation on "free access" imposed by Article XI1 depending on the
meaning that one attaches to the use of the term "reciprocity" in Article

xn.

Article III, by making international law, including the Charter of the
Subi.
CS Sma.

REP.63

a t 8. See

W. 64 a t

a h

Sma.

REP.69

at I.

10.

"Statements o f the A u s h delegate in Sma. &P. 71 at 10, and the A u s t t d h ddcgate in
W. 71 of 1f.
"Smd. REP. 63 at 10.
Statement by Ambawdor Goldberg, wpI8 note 13, at 80.

SUM.
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United Nations, applicable to outer space and celestial bodies, further reinforces Article I. Indeed, there is considerable overlap between Article 111
and the second paragraph of Article I which assures the availability of
outer space and cekstial bodies "for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance
.I' Except for minor drafting changes, Article
with international law
111was taken verbatim from Article I11 of the Soviet draft, which is merely
a restatement of Paragraph 4 of the Declaration of Legal Principles. Although Article l of the United States draft also contained a reference t o
the applicability of international law, formal discussion in the Subcommittekof the substance of Article 111 ended momentarily after it began,
when the United States delegate stated that the Soviet text was acceptable
to his delegation."
There could hardly be any dispute over the theoretical application of
international law to outer space and celestial bodies in view of the relative
absence of specific rules of law in this area. However, Article I11 is important in itself if viewed in the light of the consensus reached earlier,
that this Treaty is intended to establish basic principles applicable to
conduct in outer space and on celestial bodies. By virtue of Article 111, as
Ambassador Goldberg later stated before the Political Committee, "As man
steps into the void of outer space, he will depend for his survival not only
on his amazing technology but alio on this other gift which is no less
precious: the rule of law among n a t i ~ n s . 'One
~ may wonder what are the
principles of international law applicable to outer space and celestial bodies,
aside from those that might be derived from the United Nations Charter.
Although various analogies may be suggested (e.g., rules governing freedom of the seas), the principal thrust of Article III is to establish the
applicability of rules of law to activity in outer space and on celestial
bodies, as distinct from each nation unto itself. The text of Article III,
along with the texts of Articles I and 11, was accepted by the Working
Group of the Legal Subcommittee on 29 July 1966:'

...

C. No Weapons Of Mass Destructiort Shall Be Placed In Orbit Or On
Cekstial Bodies, Or Stationed In Outer Space In Any Other Manner;
Celestial Bodies Shall Be Used Exclusively For Peaceful Purposes
Article IV of the Treaty constitutes, as President Johnson stated, "the
most important arms control development since the 1963 treaty banning
nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space and under water.'* Ambassador
Goldberg explained to the Political Committee of the General Assembly
that:
This article restricts military activities in two ways:
First, it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the earth,
"SUM. REP. 64 at 10.
"Statement by Ambvsador Goldberg, wpra note 53, at 79.
*'The text of W c l c I was accepted as Working Group/L.3; Article 11 wu accepted as Working Gmp/L.7; and Article III as Working Groupfi.8; these documcnu are in Report of tbe &gal
'Strbcmmiftec, ANNEX Il at 4, 8, and 9 respectively.
=N.Y. Tima,9 Dec. 1966, at 1, wl. 8.
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install on the moon or any other celestial body, or o h w i s e station in outer
space, nuclear or any other weapon of mass destruction.
Second, it limits the use of the mocm and other celestial bodies exclusively
to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installations or fortifications, testing weapons of any kind, or
conducting military maneuvers."

Article IV is taken from Articles 8 and 9 of the United States draft.
Both the United States and Soviet drafts reflect principIes previously agreed
upon in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and United Nations Resolution
1 8 8 4 (XVIII), adopted by the General Assembly by acclamation on 1 7
October 1963." I n addition, the last sentence of Article 9 of the United
States draft, which provided for the use of military prsonnel, facilities,
or equipment for peaceful purposes, is quite similar t o Article I, Paragraph 2, of the Antarctic Treaty.= Ambassador Goldberg explained to
the Legal Subcommittee that:
As in the exploration of the Antarctic, man could not have penetrated
outer space and survived in that hostile environment unless he had been
able to draw u p the benefits of all research, civilian or military, involving
both personnel and equipment. For any country engaging in space activity,
military personnel, facilities and equipment played an indispensable role and
would continue to be an essential part of future space programs.=

Except for two daerences of opinion, t o be discussed below, agreement on
the final text of Article IV was reached towards the conclusion of the
Geneva portion of the Session on the basis of acceptance by the United
States delegation of the language of the first sentence of Article IV of
the Soviet draft, and acceptance by the Soviet delegation of the United
States desire to include provision for the use of military personnel for
peaceful purposes."
It is noteworthy that the prohibition contained in the first paragraph of
Article IV applies t o both outer space and celestial bodies, while the prohibition contained in the second paragraph of the article applies to celestial
bodies d y . Several of the delegations questioned the propriety of excluding outer space from the coverage of the second paragraph, the implication being that outer space may be used for nonpeaceful purposes.E8However, it is a well-known fact that both the United States and the Soviet
Union have already launched satellites into outer space for military purposes, and examination of a ban on such satellites would have raised controversial issues presently within the purview of disarmament negotiations.
gStatcmmc by Ambassador Goldberg, supra note 13, i t 80.
"G. A. Rer. 1884 (XVIII) '2. S o h n l y calk upon all Sfafes: (a) To ref& from placing
in orbic around the earth
objects carrying nuclnr weapons or any other weapons of mass
destruction, h d b such w ~ p o n ron celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space
in any otha manner. (b) To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in m y way participating in
the conduct of rb foregoing activities."
OArticIe I, w a p h 2, of the Antarctic Treaty is quoted, w p r a note 17.
SUM. RE?. 65 at 9.
m W o r h g ~roup/L.4, accepted by the Working Group on 29 J d y 1966, in Reporf of fbe
Lrgd ~
~
Annex
~
tI1 at t5 .
~
,
"See nrtemmrt by the I n d h delegate, SUM. REP. 66 at 6; the Iranian delegate, SUM. REP.
66 at 7; the A@
delegate, SUM. REP. 71 at 10; the Japanese delegaze, SUM. REP. 71 at 12;
the Brazilian delegate, SUM. REP.71 at 17; and the Mexican delegate, SUM.REP.71 at 19.
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The text of

Article IV as agreed upon was conceded to be the most practical solution from the standpoint of expeditious conclusion of a treaty
on outer space. As the Soviet delegate stated, "A number of questions
would, of course, remain to be dealt with after the elaboration of the
Treaty, particularly the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes.'*' In the interim, one might conclude that any military use of outer
space must be restricted to nonaggressive purposes in view of Article 111,
which makes applicable international law including the Charter of the
United Nations.
At the conclusion of the Geneva portion of the Session, two matters
had not been resolved with respect to Article IV. The United States had
previously revised and consolidated Articles 8 and 9 of its draft and tabled
a single, two-paragraph article quite similar to Article IV of the Soviet
draft. The second paragraph of the revised United States article read as
follows:
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes. The establishment of military bases and fortifications, the testing of
any type of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers shall be forbidden. The present Treaty does not prohibit the use of any types of personnel or equipment for scientific research or any other peiceful purpose.m

The Soviet Union desired, however, to include the word "installations"
between "military bases" and "fortifications," and to ban the use of
"military equipment" on celestial bodies.
Concerning the use of the term "installations," the Soviet delegate did
not articulate any reason for his delegation's insistence on the inclusion
of that word, except for the possibility that the words "bases" and "fortifications," in Russian translation, do not adequately describe all of the
possible structures that might be erected for military use on celestial
bodies." The United States delegate argued that the term "installation7' is
too vague: possibly viewing "bases" and "fortifications" as terms cannoting use of a facility for military purposes, while "installations" might be
construed to apply to a facility used for peaceful purposes but constructed
or inhabited by military personnel.
A more important point of disagreement was whether military equipment may be used on celestial bodies. Notwithstanding the analogy in
Article I, Paragraph 2, of the Antarctic Treaty, the Soviet deIegate argued
that "if the use of military equipment in outer space was allowed, the
essence of the treaty would be distorted and a loophole would be created
for evading one of its most fundamental provisions."n The United States
= S w . REP. 66 at 6.
Workina
- Paper
- No. 6/Rev. 1, 1 August 1966, in R e m t of the Ledd Subccnnmittee, ANNEX

"

m at 4.

"SUM. REP. 65 at 10, See also a statement by the Czech d e l e t e in SUM. REP. 66 at 3.
* S U M . REP. 70 at 6.
7 . J S ~ REP.
.
6J at 11. The Soviet position was supported by the other delegations from Communist states, e.&, Bulgaria, whose delegate stated that "The inclusion of a provision prohibiting
the usc of military equipment on celestial bodies would d o r d a firm guarantee of the we of those
bodies for peuceful purposes only, and might be the means of averting future disaster." SUM. REP.
71 at 23. Also see statement by the Hungarian delegate, SVM. REP. 71 at 21.
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position was that "Equipment used in outer space had, in many cases, been
developed through military research; that was the case, in ~articular;with
respect to the rockets carrying astronauts; that could not, however, be said
to constitute a violation of the principle of the peaceful uses of outer
space."" The British delegate added that "The fact that a piece of equip
ment owed its origin to military development should not preclude its use
for peaceful purposes foreseen by the Treaty and apparent to all as peaceful purposes."7s
As a reading of the second paragraph of Article IV indicates, the United
S t a e and its supporters eventually agreed to accept the use of the term
"installations," while the Soviet Union and its supporters agreed to .the
inclusion of a provision which would not ban the use of military equipment on celestial bodies. Emphasis on the purpose for which a piece of
military equipment is to be used on a celestial body, as stressed by the
United States delegate, is reflected in the last sentence of Article IV. Thus,
aiide from the first paragraph of Article IV, the placement of a weapon
or other item of military equipment of any description on a celestial
body would appear to be prohibited unless it can be demonstrated that the
item of military equipment will be devoted solely to the ~eacefulexploration or use of the celestial body. Agreement on the final text of Article
lV was'not reached until after the close of the New York portion of the
Session in the course of compromisiig the few outstanding differences
which stood at that time as a barrier to announcement of the agreement
on the treaty.

D. Assistance A d Return Of Astronauts And Space Vehicles; Notifkation
OfDangerous Phwmena In Outer Space Or On CekstMl Bodies.
Article V of the Treaty contains two distinct though related principles.

The first two paragraphs set forth the principle of assistance w and return
of astronauts, a subject which had been discussed in considerable detail
during previous sessions of the Legal Subcommittee." The text of the first
two paragraphs of the Article was taken almost verbatim from Article IX
of the Soviet draft which restated Paragraph 9 of the Declaration of Legal
e s assistance and return are contained
Principles. Although the ~ r i n c i ~ l of
in Article 5 of the United States draft, the United States delegate acceded
to the Soviet version subject to minor drafting changes." The third paragraph of Article V is derived from a proposal made by the United States
during the Geneva portion of the Session as follows:
A State conducting activities in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall promptly notify the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of any information relating to the physical safety of astronauts."

In the Working Group, this proposal was revised w require notification
"SUM, RHP. 70 a% 6.
"SUM. RBP. 71 at I.
"For commentary on the Leg4 Subcommittee's work on wistvlu and return, see Dembling
md h,
supra note 21.
" S w Rm. 66 at 8.
Id.
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of either the other parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General. It is
noteworthy that the third paragraph of Article V constitutes a mandatory
reporting obligation which the Soviet Union accepted. As discussed in
connection with Article XI, the Soviet delegation rigorously adhered to
its position that the reporting of activities in outer space and on celestial
bodies generally should be only on a voluntary basis. As a result of the
Soviet view, Article XI is ambiguous, as distinguished from the comparatively unequivocal obligation imposed on parties to the Treaty by the
third paragraph of Article V.
The principles of assistance to astronauts in distress and their return to
the launching State or other State of registry were already accepted by
the members of the Legal Subcommittee as constituting humanitarian obligations. Thus, there was little discussion beyond that noted above; and
the text of Article IV was accepted by the Working Group shortly before
As mentioned above, howthe close of the Geneva portion of the Sessi~n.~
ever, several delegations had expressed the desire that the Subcommittee
continue progress towards the conclusion of detailed treaties on assistance
and return liability, and that the Treaty under discussion should not prejudice the efforts undertaken with respect to those other treaties. Thus, in
connection with Article V, the Indian and Australian delegates proposed
the inclusion of another paragraph which would have specifically provided
that the provisions of Article V are adopted without prejudice t o the
provisions of any subsequent treaty applicable to the matter of assistance
and return of astronauts." This proposal was adopted in the form of a
paragraph included in the General Assembly Resolution which commended
the Treaty, adopted on 19 December 1966." Paragraph 4 (a) of the Resolution constituted a request by the General Assembly that the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space continue its work on the elaboration
of agreements on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles,
and on liability for damages caused by the launching of objects into outer
space.
E. Parties Shall Bear International Responsibility For Nutianal
Activities In Outer Space.
Article VI of the Treaty assures that the parties cannot escape their
international obligations under the treaty by virtue of the fact that activity
in outer space or on celestial bodies is conducted through the medium of
nongovernmental entities or international organizations. Perhaps the most
important of the three sentences from the standpoint of domestic concern is the second, which states that the activities of nongovernmental
entities in outer space and on celestial bodies shall require authorization
and continuing supervision by the State concerned. The obvious example
of activity covered by the second sentence is that of the Communications
Satellite Corporation, a nongovernmental entity whose activities are
working Gratp/L.f and Colllt 1, 1 Aug. 1966, in Report of tbr Lraal Submrtiitke. ANNHI

I!

at 6.

"SUM. REP. 66 at 10.
U.N.Doc. A/RES./2222

"

(XXI) (1966).
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authorized and regulated by United States federal agencies pursuant to
federal statutes and renulations. However. while no one would doubt the
need for governmental control over space activity at its present stage,
the second sentence of Article VI would *~rohibit.as a matter of treaty
obligation, strictly private, unregulated activity in outer space or on
celestial bodies even at a time when such private activity becomes most
common-place Although the terms "authorizationy' and "continuing supervision" are open to ditlerent interpretations, it would appear that Article
VI requires a certain minimum of licensing and enforced adherence to
government-imposed regulations.
Article VI was taken almost verbatim from Amcle VI of the Soviet
draft, which was in turn based on Paragraph S of the Declaration of Legal
Principles. The United States draft contained no comparable provision but
the United States delegate readily acceded to the Soviet version subject to
changing the term "nongovernmental bodies corporate" to "nongovernmental entities," the word "corporatey' not being adequately descriptive.=
When the Soviet delegate accepted this minor change, debate ended on
the first two sentences of Article Vi. A more difficult question was posed
by the third sentence, which purports to make international organizations
responsible for compliance with the Treaty with respect t o activities conducted in outer space or on celestial bodies by these organizations. Although
Paragraph 5 of the Declaration of Legal Primipks contains a similar provision, it is not necessary for the purposes of a General Assembly resolution
to provide a mechanism for creating contractually binding obligations
between various states or groups of states. However, the restatement of
Paragraph 5 of the Declaration as a treaty provision raised such questions
as: whether international organizations should be permitted to become
parties to the Treaty, whether they should be permitted to incur treaty
obligations as entities independent of their member states which are parties to the Treatv, whether members of an international organization
to the Treaty could become indirectlv bo&d to the
which are not
Treaty obIigatiti- by virtue of thiir membership in an organization which
has become a party to rhe Treaty, and other questions of like import.
The debate which developed out of consideration of the last sentence of
Article VI led to the adoption of Article XIII, which specifically provides
for the treatment of international intergovernmental organizations under
the Treaty." However, the last sentence of Article VI was retained even
though it contained no provision for international organizations to become
parties to the Treaty. The Soviet delegation was categorically opposed to
any provision which would exempt international organizations from respO&biLity for their activities i n outer space and yet was unwilling to
accept a provision which would place such organizations on an equal footing with the States Parties to the Treaty.-

-

"SUM. %P. 66 at 12.
UPrsnmably, activity by international n o n g T e n d organ++s
fim two sentmcea of Article VI providing for rrsponslbity, auth-c~on
states. concerned.

S ( S t t u REP. 70 at 3.

wiU be subject to the
and s u p a v i t i by the
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Since the Soviet delegation refused to consider any modifications to the
last sentence of Article VI, the gap in coverage remained but was resolved
in part by Article XIII. Article VI together with Article XI11 appear t o
require States which are parties to the Treaty, when they conduct activities through an international organization, to use their best efforts to
secure compliance by the international organization with the obligations
set forth in the Treaty. Such compliance could be readily obtained if the
organization is comprised entirely of parties to the Treaty, or such parties
at least hold the balance of power in the organization. However, if States
Parties to the Treaty do not have sufficientpower to determine the conduct
of the international organization in question, Articles VI and XI11 might
be construed to require such parties to disasociate themselves from activity
of the organization which is violative of the Treaty, or to resign entirely
from the organization.
When it appeared to the various delegations during the Geneva portion
of the Session that there was little possibility of obtaining agreement on
any modifications to the last sentence of Article VI, this Article was
accepted in the form in which it appears in the Treaty." Resolution of
the status of international organizations was a subject of further discussions
during the New York portion of the Session and thereafter.

F. Parties To The T r e ~ t yThat Lawcb Or Promre The hunching Of
Objects Into Outer Space Shall Be Liabk For Damuges.
Article VII concerning liability was also taken almost verbatim from
an article of the Soviet draft, in this case Article W.The Soviet draft
was based on Paragraph 8 of the Declmatkm of Legal Princiiles. Although
the United States draft contained no similar provision, the United States
delegate readily agreed to the inclusion of Article VII of the Soviet draft,
subject to minor drafting ~hanges.~
The United States delegate, along
with others, recognized that the Legal Subcommittee was in the process of
drafting a detailed treaty on liability, but no objection was raised w the
mere inclusion of an article stating the general principle in the present
Treaty on outer space and celestial bodies. As the French delegate stated:
The questions of liability and assistance were extremely complicated, and
if any reference to them was included in the treaty under discussion, it
should be very brief and simple and should merely establish the principle concerned Any additional details might deal too rapidly with problems which
bad not yet been senled.'17
On this basis, agreement was reached shortly before the close of the Geneva
portion of the Session on the inclusion of Article VII of the Soviet draft
with minor modifi~ations.~~
The subject of international liability for damage caused by space vehicles
is indeed cme involving a multitude of p r o b l w discussed elsewhere by
as Workiug Groupfi.6, 1 Aug. 1966, in RePorf of tbe Legd S u b ~ o m ~ f tANn,

a ~REP.
m 67 at 9.
n S m a . Rm. 67 at 10.
"Working Groupfi.2, 28 July

1966, in

11 it 7.
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the authors in connection with the work of the Legal Subcolnmittee on
the draft conventions on liability.- Since Article VII of the Treaty is
essentially a repetition of Paragraph 8 of the Deckration of Legal Principles, these problems were hardly touched upon during the Fifth Session
in the course of discussion on liability. However, the Indian delegate questioned the meaning of the word "internationally," as used to modify
"liable," and stated that the article would only be acceptable if "internationally" meant "absol~tely.'~But other delegations noted that the
concept of "absolute liability" was still being reiined in discussions of the
detailed draft treaties on liability and doubted the feasibility of embodying
the concept of absolute liability in the text of Article VII. As the Australian delegate noted, "At earlier sessions the Subcommittee had found
that absolute liability was necessarily subject to limitaticms and qualijications if justice was to be achieved.'*'A number of delegations supported the view of the Indian delegate that
the word "internationally" as used in Article VII is ambiguous if it does
not mean "absolutely." For this reason, several delegations proposed to
include a sentence, in Article VII, or elsewhere in the Treaty, making
express reference to the conclusion of a detailed treaty on liability, in the
on assistance and
same manner as suggested in connection with Article -v,
return, discussed above.'' In rebuttal, the Lebanese delegate raised doubts
that it is legally possible to refer in a treaty to an agreement which had
not yet been concluded. The argument was ended when the United States
delegate concurred in the Lebanese delegate's view, stating that the force
of Article VII might be weakened if a spec& reference to an agreement
not yet negotiated were included in the present Treaty.98The Soviet delegate then added his opinion that a special statement referring to the agreements to be concluded on liability would not be necessary.= As noted
above in connection with the d&ussion of Article V on Aistance and
return, Paragraph 4 (a) of the General Asernbly Resolution commending
the Treaty requests the Legal Subcommittee to continue its work on the
elaboration of agreements on liability and assistance and return." It was
hoped that this paragraph of the ~ A l u t i o nwould alleviate the fears of
same of the delegations that Articles V and VII would prejudice the work
of the Legal Subcommittee on the other treaties.

G. Jurisdiction And Ccnrtrol Over Personnel And Objects Are Not
Aflected By Their Presence In Outer Space Or On Celestial Bodies.
~ k i c l eWI of the Treaty consists of three sentences* two of which
state general rules concerning control and ownership of personnel and
objects while in Quter space and on celestial bodies. The third sentence

rvw note 25.

"Dembling and Anms,
mSmr.~RE~.
67 at 10;
"SUM. REP. 71 at 14.
"Belgium, Smr. REP. 67
"SUM. REP. 67 at 11.
Id. at 12.

at 8.

it

11; AltrrnliP, SIM.

U.N. Doc A/RES./2222 (XXI)

(1966).

REP. 67

at 11.
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imposes an obligation upon parties to the Treaty t o return found objects
to the party to the Treaty on whose registry they are camed. The State
of registry is required to furnish identifying data if so requested. The
third sentence, in providing for the return of space objects, can be regarded as a companion provision to Article V which provides for the
assistance and return of astronauts. The return of space vehicles to the
State of registry has been considered by the Legal Subcommittee in previous sessions as a part of a treaty that, if adopted, would regulate the
assistance and return of a~tronauts.~
Artiile VIII was taken from Article V of the Soviet draft which virtually repeated Paragraph 7 of the Deckratdon of Legal PrinciPles. Article
7 of the United States draft was a similar provision but was concerned
with control of persons and ownership of objects only on celestial bodies.
Also, the United States version did not contain a provision for the return of objects. However, the United States delegate readily acceded to
the Soviet version, applicable to both outer space and celestial bodies, subject to a few minor drafting changes The most noticeable change was the
substitution of the word "landed" for "delivered to" in the second sentence.''Agreement on the final text of Article VIII was reached one week
before the close of the Geneva portion of the Session, prior to agreement
on the final text of any other article:'

H . Parties To The Treaty Shall Avoid Harmful Contamhation Of Outer
Space, Celestial Badks, And Tbe Envirmmerat Of Earth, And
Shall Consult With Otber Parties Regardi?zg
Potentially Harmful Experi.ments.
As stated by a leading proponent of the Treaty as an instrument of
international cooperation, Article IX is "a provision which is designed to
protect outer space and the celestial bodies from contamination and pollution and to protect the legitimate programmes of States from undue interference."''
Article IX was taken from Article VIII of the Soviet draft and Article
10 of the United States draft. The Soviet version was in turn a reiteration
of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration of Legal Princitks. Article IX of the
Treaty closely follows the text of the Soviet version. However, the Soviet
Union- agreed to add specific language making the provision applicable
to celestial bodies in addition to outer space, and agreed to add the provision of the United States draft prohibiting parties to the Treaty from
conducting experiments which might cause adverse changes in the environment of earth.'"
The first sentence of Article IX restates the principle of international
O"Dembling and Arum, mpa nore 2 f , at 338.
SUM. REP. 66 at 11.
Working Gmup/L.l and Corn. 1, 27 July 1966, in Report of tbe Legal Subcommitkc, ANNEX

n

at 2.

"Internationcrl Cooperation fm fba U.N. Viewpoint, at 4 ; Speech by Dr. Kurt Waldhcim
before t h e 13th Annual Meeting of the Amercian Astronauticd Society, Dallas, Texlp (1967). Dr.
Waldheim is the Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
100Sma.RI9. 68 at 3 , 4.
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cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies
for the benefit of all rnankii enunciated in the Preamble and Articles I
and I11 of the Treaty. However, Article IX lays stress upon a particular
element of such international cooperation which is, as stated by the Canadian delegate, "that States should conduct their activities in outer space
with due regard for the corresponding interests of other States?" The
remaining sentences in Article IX implement this principle of "'due regard"
for the interests of other States.
The second sentence combines the second sentence of Article WI of
the Soviet draft and Article 10 of the United States draft. By virtue of
this provision, parties to the Treaty must conduct their activities in such
a manner so as to-avoid the harmful contamination of outer space or
celestial bodies and adverse changes in the environment of earth. T h e
third and fourth sentences establish the procedure of international consultations as the method of enforcing the obligations stated in the first
two sentences. The third sentence imposes a mandatory obligation upon a
party planning a potentially harmful experiment to consult with other
parties. Most significantly, the fourth sentence provides each party with
the right to request consultations concerning a potentially harmful activity
or experiment planned by another State in outer space or on a celestial

MY.

The Japanese delegation proposed to add language which would have
required parties planning potentially harmful experiments to report such
planned experiments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations before undertaking them.'" The Soviet delegate, however, disapproved of
this suggestion, stating that the essential information would be communicated more quickly to the other parties to the Treaty if the SecretaryGeneral were not utilized as an intermediary. In addition, and more important, he regarded the Japanese suggestion to be in conflict with the
position of the Soviet Union that the Secretary-General not play a role
in the application of the Treaty by States.'- Although the Soviet delegate,
after much debate, agreed to 'Article XI, which provides for the reporting
of activities in outer space and celestial bodies to the Secretary-General,
he drew a sharp distinction between the mandatory ccmsultations in advance of the event, under Article IX, and what he regarded as voluntary
reporting after the event, under Article XI:OC The Soviet view of the
proposed Japanese amendment to Article IX is consistent with the acceptance by the Soviet delegation of the third paragraph of Article V. That
paragraph requires the reporting of phenomena considered hazardous t o
astronauts either to the other parties to the Treaty or the SecretaryGeneral. In view of the unequivocal refusal of the Soviet delegation to
accept any provision requiring mandatory reporting to the SecretaryGeneral, the Japanese proposal was dropped and agreement was reached
lo'

Id. at 10.

leaId.

at 1-6.

"'Id. at 7-8.
IM Id. at 8. The

Soviet
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dn the text of Article IX, including the mandatory provisions for consultations of potentially harmful experiments, shortly before the close of
the Geneva portion of the Session."
I . Parties To The Treaty Shall Consider Requests By 0 t h Parties To Be
Afforded An OPPortunity To Observe The Flight Of Space Objects
Launched By Those States; T h Nature Of The Opportknity
Afforded Shall Be Determined By Agreement Between
The Parties C o n c m d
to the establishment and
Article X of the Treaty pertains
use of tracking facilities by parties to the Treaty on the territory of 0thmaterial reflectparties. Although there is little in the available
ing discussions on this matter, protracted disagreem~tamong delegations,
particularly between the United States and Soviet delegations, proved to
be a major stumbGg block to agreement on the Treaty as a whole. Ambassador Goldberg stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "This
is a provision that gave us a great deal of trouble. It required long negotiation to come out as it did."*
The genesis of the provision is in the second s e n m e of Article I of the
Soviet draft which provided that 'The parties to the Treaty undertake to
accord equal conditions to States engaged in the exploration of outer
space." No comparable provision appeared in the United States draft.
Essentially, the Soviet Union was seeking the inclusion of a most-favored
nation clause with respect to the availability of tracking facilities. Mr.
Morozov, the head of the Soviet delegation, explained that this sentence in
the Soviet draft "meant that if State A permitted State B to build a tracking station on its territory, State C, which was pursuing the same peaceful aims in space, should be given the opportunity t o build a similar
station on A's territory. The provision, of course, would not affect the
similar right of State A to refuse to grant such privileges to either State B
or State C."lWAlthough the Soviet position received some adverse comment
during the Geneva portion of the Session? there appears to have been
little thought that the Soviet delegation would insist on such a provision
to the point of jeopardizing agreement on other provisions. However,
towards the clme of the Geneva portion of the Session, the Soviet delegation introduced a working paper which sought to clarify the meaning of
the second sentence of Article I of its draft, and made clear Soviet insistence for a mandatory most-favored nation provision on the availability of
tracking f acilities.lm
When the New York portion of. the Session opened, the United States
delegation and its supporters strongly opposed the Soviet proposal. Indeed,
Working Group/L.9, 2 Aug. 1966, in Report of the Legal Subconmritfee, ANNEXIl at 10.

"Seuate H e h g s , sfcpra note 13, at 43.

SUM.REP. 63 at 6.
lMSec statements by the Brazilian delegate, SLM. REP. 63 at 9; the United Kingdom delegate,
Svaa. REP. 63 at 9 ; and the United States delegate, SUM. RHP. 63 at 10.
1"9Working Paper No. 23/CoRP.. 1, 29 July 1966, in Reporf of tbe Legal Subcommiftee, ANNEX
at 12: SVM. REP. 70 at 2.
lM
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it appeared that success or failure of the negotiations would depend on
whether an accommodation could be reached on the availability of tracking facilities to parties to the Treaty. Ambassador Goldberg stated that
"The United States could not understand why the Soviet Union now r e
prded the tracking facilities proposal as the key point of the whole
Treaty. The question of arms control, and the need to translate into
treaty form the elements of the Declaratian of Leg11 Pr)nci$les were of
far greater importance."11o
The United States delegate explained that his delegation could not accept
the Soviet proposal since it
appeared to be for the benefit of the space powers alone, for it would give a
?ace power the right to require of a non-space power equivalent facilities
in regard to the tracking of space objects if the mn-space power had previously granted facilities of that kind to another State. Thus the State would
be bound to accord tracking facilities without reference to any bilateral
negotiations . . . . Under the Soviet
if State A had granted tracking
facilities to State B, A must grant equal facilities to State C, apparently
regardless of any term or mutual consideration which formed the basis of
the agreement between A and B. Furthermore, the number of space powers
was growing constantly; thus, the Soviet proposal would place an unknown
and indefinitely enlarging obligation on non-space powers. The effect would
be to discourage accession to a treaty which contained agreed e l k t s of
the highest importance. Moreover, the proposal put a premium on n o cooperation. The Soviet text did not require State A to offer tracking
facilities to State B. Only if State A had extended such facilities to a third
party was it obliged to make the same facilities available to State B. Besides,
a country having tracking facilities and using them exclusively for its own
space programs would have no obligation at all towards other countries.
In that way, a State that did not cooperate with others was plaSced in the
strongest position to demand that States wishing to cooperate must extend
every possible assistance to it. Finally, the installation of tracking facilities
in the temtory of a host country raised many technical and political questions
which could only be dealt with bilaterally?"

The United States was supported in opposi~ionto the Soviet proposal by
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Lebanon,
Mexico, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.lu
Notwithstanding the strenuous objections of the United States and its
supporters, the Soviet Union tabled a revised working paper which reiterated its earlier position, but stated in a second paragraph that any
expenses incurred by a party to the Treaty in rendering assistance to another party for the purpose of observing the flight of space objects would
Hungarian and
be reimbursed by the party receiving the assistance.""e
Bulgarian delegations supported the Soviet working paper.'" From a stateSUM. REP. 73 at 4.
Id. at 4-1.
'"See statements by the United Kingdom delegate, S m REP. 71 at 5 ; the Austrian delegate,
S m . b p . 71 a t 11; the Japanese delegate, SUM. k p . 71 at 13; the Austrzlhn delegate, S m .
RIP. 71 at 15; the B d a n delegate, Svaa. ReP. 71 at 17-18.
Working Paper Na 29, 13 Sept. 1966, in Report of :be Legal Subc&ffee,
ANNEX IV
11°

at 2.
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ment by the Soviet delegate, it was apparent that the Soviet Union wished
to use the Treaty as a vehicle to place itself in a more equal position visA-vis the United States in the acquisition of a world-wide tracking network.'" The effect of the most-favored nation provision regarding the
use of tracking facilities would be to require any party to the Treaty,
which permitted its territory to be used for tracking facilities by the
United States or France, for example, to afford the Soviet Union the same
right.
The New York portion of the Fifth Session adjourned without an
accormnodation on the use of tracking facilities and, for a time, it appeared
that agreement on the Treaty as a whole would be postponed indefinitely.
However, extensive bilateral negotiations continued to be held between
the United States, the Soviet Union, and other States, particularly those
which have already granted tracking facilities to the United States.''.
Agreement was reached on the text of Article X shortly before the entire
Treaty was approved by the General Assembly. Although the mostfavored nation principle sponsored by the Soviet Union was includd in
the Treaty, the disagreement was resolved essentially in favor of the
United States' position. Parties to the Treaty which afford tracking facilities to other parties are only obligated to "consider on a basis of equality
any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an
opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those
States." However, as Ambassador Goldberg stated before the General
Assembly's Political Committee:

. ..

It is quite clear from the text of the Artick
that there must be
agreement between the parties concerned for the establishment of a tracking
facility. The Article as thus revised recognizes that the elements of mutual
beneht and acceptability are natural and necessary parts of the decision
whether to enter into an agreement concerning such a facility, and it properly
incorporated the principle that such State which is asked to cooperate has
the right to consider its legitimate interests reaching its decisi~n.~"

Since this 'interpretation remained unchallenged, it appears that the Soviet
Union essentially acceded to the United States position.

J . Parties T o The Treaty Shall Agree.To Inform The Secretary-General Of
The United Nations As Well As The Public And T b International
Scientific Community, To The Greatest Extent Feasible And
Practicable, Of The Nature, Conduct, Locations And
Results Of Such Activities.
Article XI of the Treaty, a provision for reporting of activities in outer
spa& and on celestial bodies, originated with Article 4 of the United
States draft. The United States initially took the position that parties to the
Treaty should be under a mandatory obligation to "promptly provide the
Secretary-General of the United Nations with a descriptive report of the
REP. 73 at 6-7.
See Ambassador Goldberg's statement in Senate Hearings, snfira note 53, at 1J4-11.
"'Statement by Ambusador Goldberg, supra note 53, at 82.
lW
SUM.
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nature, conduct and locations" of activities on celestial bodies and "make
the &dings of such activities freely available to the public and the international scientific community." The Soviet Union had no comparable
provision in its draft. But shortly after the Geneva portion of the Session
opened, the Soviet delegation readily acceded to the United States view, at
least to the extent that there should be some provision in the Treaty for
reporting and disseminating information. However, the Soviet proposal
was that the reporting of activities on celestial bodies should be a voluntary
matter on the part of the States concerned:
A State conducting activities cm celestial bodies will, on a voluntary basis,
inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations and also the public
and the international scientiiic community of the nature, conduct and locations of such activities?"

The Soviet delegation relied on the precedent established by General
Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI)
, 1961, which, inter aliu, provided for
the exchange of information relating to space activities on a voluntary
basis."' But, as the Canadian delegate suggested, although Resolution 1721
(XVI)established a precedent with respect to the principle of reporting,
it did not create a treaty obligation, and therefore did not preclude the
establishment of a mandatory requirement for the dissemination of scientific and technical information to the entire world.w
As expected, debate during the Geneva portion of the Session took the
form of argument over whether reporting of activities in outer space and
on celestial bodies should be mandatory or voluntary. In supporting the
United States position, the Australian delegate argued that obligatory reporting of activities on celestial bodies is a "logical corollary to provisions
already agreed upon in substance which called for freedom of scientific
investigation in outer space and on celestial bodies, and for international
cooperation in such investigation. If cooperation among nations were td
be sought, full exchange of information would be necessary as a matter
of treaty obligation.""' Indeed, the United States and its supporters were
seeking to embody in treaty form a principle that had already become a
hallmark of the United States space program: a requirement that'there
be full dissemination of scientific and technical information for peaceful
purp0ses.l"
"'Working Paper No. 4, 21 July 1966, in Report of tbe Leg& S?rbcmnmitfee, ANNEXIII at 3.
"'Statanent of the Soviet delegate, S m . REP. 64 at 12.
uaSUM. REP. 65 at 4.
'"SLM. REP. 6 f at 7. The Italian delegate made essentially the same argument, SUM. REP. 70
at 9.
=National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1918,
102(c), us m d e d . 42 U.S.C 2451 (c)
pmvidcr that:
The aeronautical and space activities of the United States ahall be conducted so u to
contribute materially to one a more of the following objectives:
(1) The expansion of h&
knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere
and space; . .
( 7 ) Cooperation by the United States with ocher nations and groups of nations
in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the r6~1fd
.
thurof
Section 203 (a) (3) of the s:me Act, 42 U.S.C. 2473 (a) ( 3 ) , requires the National A c m ~ ~ u t i c s
provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination
and Space Admkhmtion to
of infomuti00 coawning its activities and the results the~eof."
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The Soviet Union continued to oppose any provision for mandatory
reporting, however, and efforts at compromise were thus generated. Towards the close of the Geneva portion of the Session, the United Arab
Republic [U.A.R.] submitted a working paper which essentially retained
the Soviet proposal for voluntary reporting in the &st paragraph, but
added a second paragraph providing that "All information shall be
promptly submitted, preferably in advance or at the carrying out of these
activities or immediately after." A third paragraph provided that
The United Nations should be prepared to disseminate these [sic] information immediately and effectively after receiving the said information which
has to be ample and in detail for the benefit of the general public and the
international scientific c o m m u n i t ~ . ~
Although one might seek to interpret the second paragraph of the U.A.R.
proposal as a mandatory reporting provision, a fair reading of the first
two paragraphs together would seem to indicate that the U.A.R. was suggesting that the parties to the Treaty would agree to report voluntarily
on their activities, but if a party chooses to report on a particular activity,
it must do so promptly. At least the Soviet Union appears to have regarded
the U.A.R. draft a s preserving reporting only on a voluntary basis, for
the Soviet delegation accepted the U.A.R. draft.= However, the United
States delegation agreed to the U.A.R. draft only to the extent that it
provided that "The United Nations should undertake to ensure the dissemination of information as soon as it was received."* The agreement
thus reached resulted, with changes in wording, in the last sentence of
Article XI of the Treaty: "On receiving the said information the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it
immediately and effecti~ely."~
At the outset of the New York portion of the Session, agreement had
still not been achieved on a general reporting provi~ion..~In order to
meet the objections raised by the Soviet Union, the United States proposed
a revised version of its Article 4 which did not obligate the parties to
report on their activities in outer space and on celestial bodies without
exception."' The key language of the new United States proposal was
Working Paper No.

~/%RR.

1, 27 July 1966, in Report of tbe

LPgd Subcommittee, ANNEX

JlI at 5.
at 3.
at 5.
18"0ne might question the legality of the last sentence of Article X as an attempt by states
which are parties to a multilateral t m t y to impose an obligation on an i n t e m t i o d organization
which is not a party. However, the United Nations had already undertaken certain activities in
the exchange of information relating to outer space matters pursuant to prior General Assembly
resolutions such as 1721 (XVI), 20 December 1966, and 2130 (XX), 21 December 1961. And,
it might be argued that in epdorsing the Outer Space Treaty by resolution on 19 December 1966,
the General Assembly was impliedly undertaking to carry out any obligations sought to bc imposed
upm it consistent with its prior resolutions. As a practical matter, the Secretary-Gend would
hardy decline to abide by the intent of the last sentence of Article XI.
la' It should be noted, in thin connection, that agreement had already been achiuved on mandatory reporting provisions with respect to two spec& subject matters. Pursuant to Amcle V, phenomena discovered in outer space or on celestial bodies which might endanger the life or health
of astronauts must be reported to the other parties to the T r a t y or to the Secretary-General. The
duty of parries, which plan p o d a l l y harmful experimens, to c o d t with other pa&, pursuant
to Aaicb E,implip the duty to report on r h o s experiments.
SUM. REP. 7 0
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that the parties to the Treaty, "to the extent feasible and practicabk, will
promptly submit reports to the other Parties to the Treaty, The SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, and to the international scientific cornmunity." (Emphasis added.) The U.A.R. revised its proposal to accord
with the United States revision.*' The phrase "to the extent feasible and
practicable" is identical to that used in the analogous reporting provision
in the Antarctic Treaty, and the text finally agreed upon for Article XI
of the Outer Space Treaty closely parallels the language of Article III of
the Antarctic Treaty.""
With the introduction of the revision of Article 4 of the United States
draft, little differenceremained between the United States and Soviet positions. AS the Italian delegate added, "[Wlith a little goodwill the Subcomroittee should be able to reach early agreementwmon a reporting provision. However, the Soviet Union and its supporters conditioned final
agreement on this and other provisions upon a resolution of the dispute
over the availability of tracking facilities.'@ Thus, agreement on the final
text of Article XI was not achieved until the parties finally agreed upon
the substance of Article X.

K. Stations, lnstallations, And Space Vehicles On The Moon A d Other
Cekstia?Bodies Shall Be Open To Representatives Of Parties On
A Basis Of Reciprocity. Representatives Shall Give Reasonubk
Advance Notice In Order That Consultations May Be Held,
Safety Precautions Taken And Interference With
Operations Avoided.
Article XI1 of the Treaty is another provision which reflects a compromise of United States and Soviet positions. Article 6 of the United States

draft initially provided that
All areas of celestial bodies, including all stations, installations, equipment
and space vehicles on celestial bodies, shall be open at all times to representatives of other States conducting activities on celestial bodies.'"

T h e Soviet draft did not contain a comparable provision although one
might regard the second paragraph of Article I of the Soviet draft as
overlapping Article 6 of the United States draft, at least to the extent
that the Soviet version provided that "there shall be free access to all
regions of celestial bodies." As discussed in connection with Article I of the
lMWorking Paper No. 31, 13 Sept. 1966, in Report of fhe Legd Subcommifter, ANNEXIV at
4. See also the statement by the United State delegate in SUM.REP. 73 at 3.
Working Paper No. 33, 14 Sept. 1966, in Rcfmrf of tbe Legd Subcommittee, ANNEXIV at 6.
aaArticle XI of the Outer Space Tmry begins: "In order to promote international cooperation
"In
in the peaceful exploration of outer space
." Article III of the Antarctic Treaty

...

. . ..

order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica
"I SUM. REP. 73 at 7
.
See statement of the Bulgarian delegate, Svar. REP. 73 at 12.
=Article 6 of the United States draft was b a d on Article W,Paragraph 3, of the Antarctic
Treaty which provides:
"MI uas of hzacctica, including all stations, insullations, and equipment within those a r e s
and all ship and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cygoer or personnel in Antarctica
shall be open at all times to inspection by m y observers designated [by the Contracting PUtigg]."
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Treaty, the Soviet Article I related more to the broad principle of freedom
of scientific investigation on celestial bodies which was eventually covered
by Article I of the Treaty. As the Soviet delegate explained, the geographical idea of "areas of celestial bodies" was on a somewhat different
plane from "stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles."'"
At the outset of the Geneva portion of the Session, the Soviet delegation accepted Article 6 of the United States draft subject to deletion of
the words "all areas of celestial bodies, including," the deletion of "at
all times," and the addition of the phrase: "on the basis of reciprocity
under the conditions that the time of the visit is to be agreed between
the parties ~oncerned.'''~ In a revision of Article 6 of its draft, the United
States delegation accepted the Soviet suggestion that the initial phrase be
deleted, but did not agree to the other proposed amendments.'" Ambassador Goldberg stated that "The deletion of the words 'at all times' and the
addition of a requirement that the time of visits would have to be agreed
upon would frustrate the right of access." He added that no d8iculties
had been experienced in carrying out the purposes of Article VII, Paragraph 3, of the Antarctic Treaty, on which Article 6 of the United States
draft was based.'' The Soviet delegate responded that the Soviet Union
fully accepted the principle of open access stated in Paragraph 6 of the
United States draft, and the proposed Soviet amendments were merely
drafting changes to clarify the intent of the par tie^.^
Notwithstanding the Soviet delegate's statement to the effect that the
Soviet amendments were merely drafting changes, there remained an important substantive difference between the United States and Soviet views
on the right of access to stations, etc., on celestial bodies.lJDThe United
States was seeking a treaty provision providing for an unlimited right of
access. The Soviet Union, while accepting the principle of open access,
was seeking to impose conditions upon the ability of individual nations to
exercise that right.
With respect to the Soviet suggestion that the phrase "at all timesy' be
deleted, the Soviet delegate e x p l a i i that his delegation did not consider
that a right of access to stations, etc., should be so absolute as to permit
access to the point of endangering the lives of astronauts or interferring
with the normal operation^.'^ This idea caught favor with certain delegatiotis who ordinarily supported the United States position on other matters:
The Japanese delegation proposed an amendment to Article 6 of the United
States draft that retained the phrase "at all times," but also added a sen%
'
Svbi. REP. 63 at 4.
'=Id. at 4-1. The Soviet amendments were later included a paragraph 4 of an amended Article
I of the Soviet draft. Workiug Paper No. 2 3 / C o ~ .I., 29 July 1966, in Report of fbe &a1 Ssb-

W ' A l i d f c c , ANNEX

m It 12.

me Working Paper No. 3, 21 July 1966, in

Report of the Lrgol Subccnnmittee, ANNEX Dl at 2.

l M S REP.
~
63 at 6.

Id.
W.As a matter of minor sigdculce, the Indian delegnte suggested that a reference to "outer'
space" be included in Anicle 6 of the Unired States draft on the suppasition that platforms will
be c o n s ~ c t e dia space. SUM.RBP. 64 at 7. It appears, howsva, that this suggestion was not taken
seriously by other delegations.
lo SUM. RID. 64 at 9, 10.
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tence providing that "representatives shall take maximum precaution not
to interfere with the normal operation of activities therein."'" The Italian
delegation also proposed an amendment to Article 6 which would have
deleted the phrase "at all times" and conditioned the right to "free, immediate access" to stations, etc., "on the understanding that the time of the
visit should not imperil the lives of the pemnnel and the functioning of
the installations in~olved."'~
Although there was general agreement that Article 6 of the United
States draft should be modified to permit denial of access to a prospective
visitor if the visit would be untimely, the Soviet suggestion that the right
of access should be on a basis of "reciprocity" provoked considerable discussion. A refusal to permit a visitor to enter a station for reasons of untimeliness need not necessarily be regarded as a refisal to permit entry
under any circumstances. The suggested inclusion of the "reciprocity"
language, however, suggested to several delegations that if a particular
nation, which controls a station on a celestial body, has no desire t o inspect
the stations, installations, etc., of other nations, it is under no obligation
to permit visitors from other stations to enter its own stations, unless
bilateral agreements provide otherwise.'= Moreover, there was a fear on
the part of nations having only very small space programs, or no s p m
program at all, that conditions of reciprocity would only benefit the space
powers. States having no station, installation, etc., ' on a celestial body
would not be entitled to visit a station controlled by another State. Or,
would "reciprocity" be so narrowly contrued as to mean that if State A
has one station and State B has five stations w a celestial body, State A
could be barred from visiting four of the five stations controlled by
State B?la The confusion was compounded by the failure of the Soviet
delegation to provide an adequate definition of "reciprocity" after having
gone on record as being in favor of "open access."
After much discussion over the meaning of reciprocity, the United
States delegate restated his nation's position as follows:
Access should not be conditional, and the notion of prior agreement implied
a sort of veto on it. Representatives of a State Party to the Treaty conducting activitks on celestial bodies should have the right of access to the
stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles of another State party
on a celestial body, regardless of whether the second State had ever claimed
or exercised a right of access itself; however, if the first State had denied
access to representatives of the second State then the latter was not required
on the principle of reciprocity t o grant access to representatives of the &st
State. That was a well-established principle of law, and that was why the
United States delegation thought that no mention of reciprocity was needed
The United States was however prepared to include in its text 'on the basis
working Paper No. 28, 4 Aug. 1966. in Report of tbe Lrgal Subcommiftee,ANNEXIII at 16.
Sk SU)& REP. 64 at 8.
Wor& Papa No. 26, 3 Aug. 1966, in Rep& of tbe &gal Subnrmmiftee,ANNEXIU at 14.
S C ~
SUM. REP. 70 at 9.
leSec statemencs by the Ausalian delegate, SUM. REP. 63 at 8; the Muiun dekgae, SUM.
h.
63 at 8; the United Kbgdom delegate, SUM. REP. 63 at 9.
144
Ses .sts-ts
by the It&
delegate, SUM. REP. 64 at 5; and the Canadian delegate, SUM.
M.64 at 7.

"

410

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[VoL 3 3

of reciprocity,' if the above-mentioned interpretation was universally shared
and if the other provisions in the article were consistent with the idea of
reciprocity:=

Thus, by the end of the Geneva portion of the Session, the United States
had acceded to including "reciprocity" language in the treaty provision
covering access to stations, etc., subject to certain interpretive caveats.'"
By the opening of the New York portion of the Session, the only remaining issue with respect to Article 6 of the United States draft involved
the desire of many of the Subcommittee members to include limitations
on the right of access in consideration of safety precautions and noninterference with ordinary operations of stations, installations, etc. The
issue was whether to condition the right of access upon prior agreement as
to timeliness, or whether the right of access should be unqualified, bur
some language included to require that prospective visitors consider such
factors as the safety of astronauts before insisting upon a right of entry.
The United Kingdom and Mexico favored the latter approachy which was
also the view of the Japanese delegation in it&proposed amendment to
Article 6 of the Soviet draft." Hungary and Bulgaria, in support of the
Soviet position, would not accept the "at all times" language of Article 6 of
the United States draft.'- The issue was resolved when the United States
.introduced a revised version of Article 6 which omitted the phrase "at all
times," -and added the language that was eventually adopted as the second
sentence of Article XII of the Treaty.'* Agreement was rapidly achieved on
the text of the United States versi~n.'~'But since the Soviet delegation and
its supporters refused to agree to any formal adoption of additional treaty
supporters refused to agree to any formal adoption of additional treaty
articles until agreement had been attained on the matter of availability of
&P. 70 at 6-7.
'"Ambassador Goldberg has made clear in subsequent statements that the agreement of the
United States to include the phrase "on the basis of reciprocity" in Article XI1 is based upon the
understanding apparently reached .that the right of access by one state is not conditioned upon
whether a second state wishes to exercise its right of access. See Ambassador Goldbug's statement,
r w a note 53, at SO; and his statement before the Senare Foreign Relations Committee in Smafe
Hearings, supra nore 53 ,. at 152.
'"Svtl. REP. 71 at 4, 20.
'=See S m . REP. 71 at 12.
'"Id. at 21, 23.
*'Working Paper No. 30, 12 Sept. 1966, in Rcporf of the Legal SYbcommifter, ANNEX at 3.
As Ambassador Goldberg later stated before the Senate Foreign Relatiom Committee:
On dectiop it seemed clear that the inspection provisions of the Antarctic Treaty from which
our access language was drawn were not in all mpects appropriate for the Outer Space Tmtp. Thic
was especially c w in view of the far greater d i d t i e s and hazards of l u u v exploration in contrast to Antarctic exploration-the extreme importance of unimpaired oxygen supply, the need for
careful conservation of life-supporting systems, and the di6culty of surface travel. We would not
want to receive a visit from the Sovtts or any other party if that visit would jeopdze the lives
of our astronauts. We also bore in mind the practical fact that for the foreseeable future it d d
be immensely diicult to engage in forbidden activities on the moon without detection. S m t t
Hearings, mpra note 13, at 153.
"Consistent wirli Ambassador Goldberg's statements regarding the United States agreement to
include the phrase "on the basis of reciprocity" in Article XII, he has also stated that the United
States' agreement to include the second sentence of Article XIZ H predicated on the und-dinp
that the requirement for reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in o r d a that appropriate
consultations be held and precautions taken, is not to be taken as a right in the state whose f
d
is being visited to veto the visit. See Ambassador Goldberg's statement, suwa note 53, at 81; and
his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senak Heaingr, supra note 53, at 153.
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tracking facilities," h a 1 agreement by the Subcommittee on the text of
Article XI1 was reached at about the same time as agreement was obtained
on Article X of the Treaty.

L. The Provisions Of Tbe Treaty Shall Apply To Parties Whether.Acting
Singly, Jointly With Other States, Or W i t h The Framework Of
Internationctl Inter-Governmental Organizations. Practical Qwstions
Shall Be &solved By Parties Either With The Appropride
International Orgmizatiun Qr With One Or More States
Members Of That International Organization, Which
Are Parties To This Treaty.
The first twelve articles of the Outer Space Treaty more or less prescribe general rules governing the conduct of parties to the Treaty. Article
XI11 does not provide any additional rules governing such conduct, but
rather seeks to establish the applicability of the substantive principles to
actions by the parties whether taken singly, jointly, or within the framework of international organizations. To a degree, the relationship of international organizations to the Treaty is ccwered by the third sentence
of Article VZ, which was taken from Article VI of the Soviet draft, which,
in turn, is a reflection of Paragraph 5 of the Declaration of Lgal Principles. The third sentence of Article VI provides that when activities are
undertaken in outer space or on celestial bodies by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with the Treaty shall be borne by
both the internationalorganization and the participants in the organization
who are also parties to the Treaty.While this provision was considered
adequate as an expression of p~CipleSincluded in a General Assembly
Resolution, several delegations regarded it inadequaw as a contractually
binding document establishjig rights and duties among the parties.
The delegations dissatisfied with Article VI of the Soviet draft represented nations whose space activity is presently being carried out withii
the framework of international organizations, such as the European Space
Research Organization, ar nations involved with other States in joint activity. Those nations, particularly the United Kingdom, France, Belgium,
Sweden, and Australia, believed that the Soviet vesion left unclear the
status of an international organization vis-a-vis States Parties to the
Treaty and also appeared to deny the benefits of the Treaty to international organizations while requiring them to assume the burden^.^ In
response to the suggestion that international organizations as separate
entities be permitted to become parties to the Treaty, the Soviet delegation insisted that under international law only a State may become a party
to a treaty, and that its proposal merely imposed the provisions of the
Treaty on the States Parties to it even when acting within the framework
of an inteznational organizationm
The British delegate, relying on an opinion by the International Court
'5'See statement by the Bulgarian delegate, SUM. REP. 7 3 at 12.
See the statement by the United Kingdom delegate, SUM. REP. 66 at 13.

Y"

"SUM.

REP. 67 at 3.
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of Justice,'" argued that since an international organization as an entity
may assume rights and duties under international law, it might be possible
for the p u r p e s of the Treaty to regard the organization as the sum of
its members. With that in mind, he introduced a proposed new article
which would establish a procedure whereby an international organization
might legally subject itself to the
of the Treaty without bean international organicoming a party to it.'w Under the ~Gtish
zation conducting activities in outer mace or on celestial bodies would file
a declaration with a depositarv au&ritv that it accepts and undertakes
td comply
- - with all of t i e UrovLions of &e Treatv exc&t the articles concerning signature, ratification and accession by parties. States which are
parties to the Treaty would be obligated to use their best efforts to "ensure" that such a declaration is filed by international organizations of
which they are members and which conduct space activities. Prior to the
time that a declaration is dled, parties to the Treaty that are members of
the organization would take steps to assure that the organization complies
with the 'cprinciples" of the Treaty."'
Although the United Kingdo& proposal received significant support,
notably from Belgium, France, Australia, and Sweden, the United States
did not intervene actively in favor of it during the debates notwithstanding
strenuous objections bv the Soviet Union and its suuuorters. The Soviet
delegate rejedtd the ~ k t i s hproposal out of hand as an attempt to endow
international organizations with the same status as States Parties to the
Treaty. Moreover, the Soviet delegate viewed the British proposal as a
vehicle to permit parties to escape their.obligations under the Treaty by
conducting their activities in outer space through the framework of an
international organization ,prior to the time that the organization Iiles a
declaration with a depositary authority."' The Italian delegate envisioned
the same loophole
and also questioned the method bv which a State not a
party to the Treaty but belonging to an international organization which
was a party, could be compelled to abide by the provisions of'the treat^."^
The Indian delegate had difliculty in understanding how States Parties to
the Treaty would "ensure" that any international organization to which
they belonged would make the necessary declarations, particularly where
the States.Parties to the Treaty are minbrity members of the organization."
as tantaAnd while the.Soviet delegation regarded the British
mount to making international organizations parties to the Treaty, the
Austrian delegation took the converse position that such organizations
would not be parties, but as non-parties they could not be required t a
fulfill their obligations under the T r e a ~ . ' ~
A.

--

-

--

-

=The United Kingdom delegate relied on the RefimJiaz Cuse, [I9491 1.C.J. 174 stating that
the United Nations, as an entity, may be considered liable in connection with reparadons for damages d e r e d in the service of the United Nations. This advisory opinion by the Court is reprinted
in 43 h.
1. INT'L L. 589 (19491.
lS6 ~ o r k n Paper
g
No. 17, 25 July 1966, in Report of tbe Lcgd Subcmnritke, ANNEX III at 8.
='The British delegate's explanation of his delegation's proposal appears in SVM. REP. 67 at 5.
"'SUM. REP.67 at 6.
ld. at 7.

==

Id.

lea

lelId.

at 8.
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In view of the opposition, the United Kingdom delegation agreed to
the inclusion of the third sentence of Article VI of the Soviet draft subject to the outcome of further discussion on the merits of the British
proposal.'" Considerable sentiment in favor of including a separate article
on international organizations was voiced by Sweden, France, Belgium,
Australia, and Iran..*- The comments made were to the effect that there
ought to be a way by which international organizations could assume
rights and responsibilities under the Treaty without becoming parties, and
that the practical problems involved in the relationships between States
Parties to the Treaty and the international organizations of which they
are members should be viewed as internal matters within the organizations.
Article XI11 is the result of these discussions. It does not provide a
mechanism whereby international organizations can become, for all practical purposes, parties to the Treaty. But it does provide that the provisions
of the Treaty shall apply to space activities camed out by parties to the
Treaty mum the framework of international intergovernmental organizations." The matter of how they will be made to apply in individual
situations is an internal matter to be resolved between the States Parties
to the Treaty and the international organizations of which they are members.
M. Miscellaneo~lsMatters.
A word should be said here about settlement of disputes. The Treaty does
not include a provision for recourse to a court, arbitral tribunal, or some
other procedure for resolution of disputes arising between parties to the
Treaty over matters covered therein. However, both the United States and
Soviet drafts contained proposed articles on settlement of disputes. Article:
11 of the United States draft provided for recoufse to the International
Court of .Justice for a decision. Article X of the Soviet draft provided
merely that "the States Parties concerned shall immediately consult together with a view to their settlement." Previous sessions of the Legal
Subcommittee cm the draft assistance and return and liability conventions
had revealed an inability on. the part of the United States and Soviet
delegations to compromise their differences on this matter.'" In the interest
of expediting agreement on the Treaty as a whole, neither the United
States nor the Soviet delegations pressed for inclusion of a specific proc
vision covering resolution of disputes, and little time during the debates
was devoted to it. In the absence of a provision on this subject, disputes
between parties over applications or interpretations of provisions of the
Treaty may be resolved in accordance with any method agreed upon by
the parties, subject, of course, to any limitations imposed by other applicable international agreements binding upon the parties t o the dispute.''*' SW. REP. 71 at J-6.
laSvaa. b ~70.at 12-13 (Sweden). Sma. REP. 70 at 1 5 (France), S u a ~REP. 71 at 7 (Belgium). S ~ a r .Rep. 71 a: 16 ( A u s d a ) , S m . Rep. 71 at 25 (Iran).
'-With respect to mmationd nongovernmenta~organizations, s e t note 83 supra.
la See Dembling and Aeons, supra note 25, at 3 56.
'-The Rumanian delegate suggested that an optional protocol be established with regard to settlement of disputes which might permit individual parties to invoke the computory jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice. Svar. RhP. 71 at 19.
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The only remaining provision which involved controversy is contained
in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article XIV. That sentence
provides that the Treaty shall be open t o all States for signature. This was
the position advocated by the Soviet Union in its draft. The United States,
in Article 12 of its draft, proposed that .the Treaty
be open for signature by States Members of the United Nations or of any
of the specialized agencies or parties to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly
of the United Nations to become a party.

The United States formulation would have probably excluded certain
non-United Nations members from being permitted to become parties to
the Treaty, notably Communist China and East Germany.
The United States delegate, supported by the United Kingdom, explained
that the formulation advocated by the United States was consistent with
that used in other United Nations treaties and resolutions.'" However, a s
explained by the Rumanian delegate in support of the Soviet position,
none of the other Treaty p r o v i s i ~purported t o discriminate between
nations; and many of the provisioix appealed to all States to participate
in regulating the activities of States in outer space and on celestial bodies
in the interest of all mankind.'- The United States agreed
to the Soviet
formulation "because of exceptional circumstances favoring a very broad
geographical coverage for the Space Treaty," but subject to the understanding that accession to the Treaty by a regime or entity not recognized by the United States does not, without more, amount to recognition
of that regime or entity by the United States.16'
Little need to be said about the remaining provisions of the Treaty.
There was some debate over what agency would constitute the depositary
authority. Article 1 3 of the United States draft provided that instruments
of ratification, approval or accession shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. The Soviet draft, in Article XI, provided
for such instruments to be deposited with governments to be designated.
The Soviet delegate explained that his delegation's position on this matter
was consistent with its position on the issue of whether "all States" or
only those
byAtheUnited Nations should be permitted to sign
the Treaty. He argued that if the Secretary-General were to become the depositary for the Treaty, the Secretary-General would have to ask the
General Assembly which States could be parties to it, thereby contradicting
the "all States" principle set forth in the first paragraph of Article XI of
the Soviet draft.l7' This argument appears to have been persuasive since
paragraph 2, as well as paragraph 1, of Article XIV, reflects the Soviet
position. The governments designated as the depositary authorities are the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The remainder of Article XIV concerns the mechanics and legal effect
SUM. REP. 68 at 17.
SUM. REP.71 at I 8.
'"Statement by Ambassador Goldberg, supra note 53, at 82.
l'O~vbf.
REP.68 at 19.

lea

19671

OUTER SPACE TREATY

45 5

of ratification and deposit of instruments of ratscation and accession.
Paragraph 3 provides that the Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five governments including the depositary governments. According to paragraph 4, ratification or accession
by a State subsequent to the entry into force of the Treaty shall be
effective with the deposit of the instrument of ratdication or accession.
Paragraph 5 requires the depositary governments to notify all signatory
and acceding States of the dates of signatures, deposits of instruments of
ratification, etc. Paragraph 6 provides that'the Treaty shall be registered
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United N a t i ~ . ' ~
Article XV pennits any State Party to the Treaty to propose amendments. For an amendment to be binding upon a party, that State must
accept the amendment and, in any event, an amendment does not enter
into force until it has been accepted by a majority of the States Parties to
the Treaty.
Article XVI provides that any party may withdraw from the Treaty by
giving written notice thereof, to the depositary governments, the withdrawal to take effect one year from the date of receipt of the notification.
However, since no notice may be given until at least one year has elapsed
after the Treaty has entered into force, no withdrawal c a n take place
until at least two years from the date the Treaty entered into force.
Article XVII specifies that the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and
Spanish texts of the Treaty are equally authentic, and that the texts shall
be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments, which shall
then transmit c d e d copies to the signatory and acceding States.

As stated at the outset of this paper, the Treaty was approved by the
United Nations General Assembly by acclamation on 19 December 1966.
The Treaty was opened for signature in Washington, London and MOSCOW
on 27 January 1967. Sixty nations signed the Treaty on that date including
the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.
Advice and
consent to ratification of the Treaty was given without a negative vote
by the United States Senate on 25 April 1967. The Treaty was approved
by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on May 18
of the same year.'"
With the Treaty having been signed and ratified by the two major space
powers, a s well as many other nations, the activities of human beings if2
k t e r space and on celestial bodies have been subjected to a regime of law.
It is true, as President Johnson stated in transmitting the Treaty to the
In Article 102 provides "1. Every truty and every international agreement entered inw by any
m&
of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible
be registared with the S e c ~ v i z tand published by it.
"2. No party to any such treaty or internmod agreement which has not been ngZstered in
accordance with the provkiom of paragraph 1 of &is Article may invoke that treaty or ogremeat
with any organ of the United Nations.''
'"Aa of this writing, instruments of rati6ution have not yet hem +ired
by the .United

State and the U.S.S.R.
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Senate for ratscation, that "In. the diplomacy of space, as in the technology of space, it is essential always that interim achievements not be
mistaken for final ~uccess."'~' In establishing certain general principles,
the Treaty leaves much to interpretation by the parties. The specific details with respect to such matters as inspection of installations on celestial
bodies, the availability of tracking facilities, and consulting over potentidy
harmful experiments are left to further arrangements to be worked out
between the States concerned. Nevertheless, the Treaty reflects a broad
international consensus that outer space and celestial bodies are to be free
for exploration and use for the ben&t of all mankind; that the principles:
of international law are applicable thereto; that celestial bodies are to be
devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes, and weapons of mass destruction
are to be banned from outer space; that assistance is to be rendered to
astronauts; that States are to be held internationally responsible for their
activities in outer space, and held liable for damages caused thereby; that
ownership of objects is not changed by their presence in outer space and
on celestial bodies; that harmful contamination of the environment of
earth, outer space, and celestial bodies shall be avoided; that information
gathered from activities in outer space and on celestial bodies is to be
broadly dkeminated; and that stations, installations, etc., on celestial
bodies are to be open for inspection.
In establishing these principles in treaty form, the parties are now contractually obligated to carry out their activities in outer space and on
celestial bodies in accordance with accepted norms and goals validated in a
legal form sigdicantly more binding upon the pames than the United
Nations resolutions and utterances of individual nations that preceded the
Treaty. As President Johnson stated in his message to the Senate, "The
future leaves no option. Responsible men push forward in the exploration
of space, near and far. Their voyages must be made in peace for purposes
of peace on earth. This Treaty is a step-a first step, but a long steptoward assuring the peace essential for the longer journey."'"

